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Introduction  
This paper is concerned with the governance of spatial inequalities in metropolitan areas. As in 
other countries, Irish metropolitan areas are characterised by significant socio-economic 
inequalities. Despite various local initiatives Ireland has yet to achieve an effective model of urban 
or metropolitan governance capable of reducing these metropolitan socio-economic inequalities. 
This paper reviews, by way of an evidenced-based Dublin City case study, an Irish metropolitan 
governance process designed to counter specific metropolitan spatial inequalities - the RAPID 
(Revitalising Areas by Planning, Investment and Development) Programme. The paper begins by 
situating the analysis in literature relating to globalisation, governance, multi-level governance and 
new localism. It proceeds to briefly outline a profile of Dublin as a city characterised by high levels 
of spatial-economic disadvantage and an ongoing process of badly managed planning and 
development (Redmond et al 2008). To review the experience of recent innovations in metropolitan 
governance and their effectiveness at tackling social exclusion this paper utilises evidence from 
three recent evaluations/reviews of the Dublin RAPID Programme supplemented with stakeholder 
interviews1. Having analysed Dublin’s experience of innovations in metropolitan governance the 
paper concludes by outlining the key lessons for broader metropolitan governance theory and 
practice. These include the problem of geopolitical fragmentation and the difficulties of working in 
highly complex patterns of local administrative governance processes, the degree to which vertical 
and horizontal arrangements have hampered rather than assisted strategies to mitigate spatial social 
inequalities and finally key issues of community capacity and political participation. 
 
The theory 
The paper begins by situating the analysis in literature relating to globalisation, governance, 
multilevel governance and new localism (Moulaert 2000, Hambleton, Savitch and Murray 2003, 
Held 2004, Buck et al 2005 and Sassen 2007). A substantial body of contemporary research on 
metropolitan areas has coincided with the emergence of new urban governance arrangements in 
many western democracies. This material, concerning the relationship between globalisation and 
social policy, charts how various pressures combine to change not only policies but also the process 
of policy making. These pressures on economic and social policy arise from the impact of 
 
1  The reviews are  
(a) A 2006 review commissioned by the Department of Community, Rural and Galteacht Affairs and carried out by 
Fitzpatrick Associates, a private Dublin-based economics consultancy, hereinafter referred to as the Fitzpatrick Review 
(b) A 2006 review commissioned by Dublin City Council and Pobal, the RAPID Programme’s national managing 
agency, hereinafter referred to as the Dolphin Review  
 (c) A half day Dublin City RAPID evaluation meeting which took place in February 2008, hereinafter referred to as the 
2008 Review. 
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modernisation, globalisation, regionalisation, urbanisation and neo-liberalism on national states 
(Scholte 2000). Policy making is a highly complex and differentiated process. This process is made 
even more complex by globalisation’s transformational influence on state-centred government 
processes as they adapt and evolve into multi-level governance processes (Cerny 2002).  
 
Multi-level governance implies that local, regional, national and supranational authorities interact 
with each other vertically and horizontally.  This is captured by the imagery of states moving 
“upward, downward and outward” (Clarke 2003:34) and of governments steering but not rowing 
(Pierre 2000 and Cerny et al 2005). Such innovation in the politics of place means changes in the 
nature of power and new urban institutions ‘or new localism’. The role of the state changes and 
both power and functions shift between administrative levels and between statutory and non-profit 
and commercial agencies at these different levels. Local government becomes less a public 
administrator and more a public planner or regulator. In this new context, public governance 
processes need to adapt quickly and devise mechanisms that allow innovative, though manageable, 
risks to be taken to meet the diverse local policy agendas arising from the impact of globalisation. 
 
 
For some commentators these developments represent a shift “from hierarchical modes of 
governance” (preoccupied with vertical relationships and the dominance of governmental 
authority), via market forms (based on competition and contracts), to “network forms” (built on 
trust and a sense of common purposes between partner agencies)” (Lepine et al 2007: 8). Others 
disagree with this assessment claiming that in nation states, governments retain sufficient influence 
over legal, financial and policy levers to ensure that governance takes place in the “shadow of 
hierarchy” (Jessop 2002: 5). Nonetheless, there is a general acceptance that governing now does 
occur in a wider range of spheres and includes a broader range of actors than previously. 
Pressurised nation states seek new options as they move from a situation where state-centred 
government is the norm to a less rigid process of multi-actor and multi-level governance. 
 
 Governance here is defined as ‘including government but also the looser process of influencing and 
negotiating with a wider range of public, private and not for profit actors, to achieve mutual goals’ 
(Hambleton 2003: 147) The flexibility and innovative capacity associated with multi-level 
governance are seen as ways to enable the state to address the threats and opportunities arising from 
globalisation. Cerny et al (2005: 18) identify a future of ‘plurilateral’ negotiations which aim to 
“co-ordinate myriad diverse actions - and to bring wider and more disparate coalitions into 
potentially tenuous forms of collective action”. Such change is referred as ‘a new localism’.  
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Hambleton, Savitch and Stewart (2003) and Sassen (2004) explore how such pressures impact 
locally and in particular impact on cities and urban environments. Sassen (2001) identifies global 
cities as those where wealth and employment creation processes are linked to service industries, 
particularly financial and legal services, and theorises they face significant challenges as 
globalisation becomes both wider and deeper in scope. Sassen expects that the governance of 
complexity gives urban civil society and urban politics specific roles in shaping globalisation.  
 
What might we expect to see in urban governance? Worldwide, various new governance techniques 
have emerged to enable the planning and delivery of policy. New terms such as glocalisation and 
glurbanisation has been coined to describe and define this new paradigm of local governance in the 
context the new challenges of facing larger cities competing in the global market place and within 
the wider metropolitan governance literature (Hoffmann–Martinot and Sellers 2005). These new 
forms of governance include networked local governance, community governance, institutional 
networking, social cooperation and micro regulatory networks. These concepts are characterised by 
strengthening local government through policy committees and stronger roles for mayors, more 
active roles for citizens in participative governance, decentralisation or devolution, institutional 
changes to strengthen local government’s capacity for engaging in partnership and networking. 
Clark (2003: 81) summaries these approaches as a “new political culture”. This can and does also 
include a new approach to fiscal management which includes service or user charges. These shifts 
are often facilitated by ‘managerialism’ where new public management administrative and financial 
devices including service level agreements, targets and indicators as well as re-regulation, 
decentralisation and privatisation are introduced to maximise local flexibility. There are obvious 
tensions between the contradictory pulls of participatory governance processes and this type of 
managerialism (Lister 2004).  
 
What does all this mean for socio-economically deprived areas of Dublin City? While it is not clear 
that Dublin has sufficient scale to be ‘a global city’ it is characterised by financial and service 
industries. We should therefore expect to see in Dublin what Jessop (2002) calls ‘glurbanisation’, 
i.e. new forms of governance in the urban and through the urban. Deindustrialisation has already 
changed who lives and works in Dublin. Inward migration for example has changed the culture of 
the city with now over 11% of the population comprised of migrants. This poses substantial 
challenges for traditional community development processes in the city and requires a new urban 
community development approach in the context of Dublin as a globalising city. Such an approach 
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must address the new challenges of racism, apartment living, migration, transition, mobility, and 
connectivity and old problems of poverty and disadvantage. This new urban order has already lead 
to tensions within the city and between the city and national level2.  
 
This paper will explore the underdevelopment of urban governance in Dublin City. It draws 
attention to tensions in managing metropolitan governance that arise when values of managerialism 
clash with community based local governance process. Further, it will argue that any attempts at 
multilevel governance or developing urban governance in Ireland are impeded by broader 
horizontal and vertical dysfunctional characteristics in Irish governance and acute levels of 
geopolitical atomisation. Weak local government systems compound the difficulties in rolling out 
effective metropolitan governance programmes in Dublin City. 
 
     Social segregation in Dublin City 
 
The paper proceeds to briefly sketch a profile of Dublin as a city characterised by high levels of 
spatial present disadvantage (Kelly and Teljeur 2004 ). Dublin City has a long proud history but a 
history also characterised by strong patterns of spatial socio economic inequality and some of the 
worst urban slums in Europe. For practical purposes we take up the story of Dublin City in 1958 
when the state’s first integrated economic development programme was introduced and resulted in a 
greatly improved economic situation and a subsequent dramatic expansion in private house 
construction and rapid development of Dublin City suburbs3. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, a 
number of ill-fated design experiments were being applied to new local authority housing schemes 
including low density tower block projects (Ballymun 1966-69) and high-density, low-rise 
courtyard based schemes (Darndale,1973-78). While pioneering in their time these were 
subsequently acknowledged as planning failures. In 1967 the Wright Report recommended housing 
an expected population increase in four self-sufficient new towns of 100,000 people. While this 
influenced future planning in Dublin City a Wright Report core recommendation that 
“neighbourhood units” of schools and associated community and retail facilities accompany each 
unit of 5,000 people was not implemented. .. The suburban growth pattern of Dublin altered again 
during the 1980s as the outward expansion of the contiguous built-up areas slowed considerably. 
 
2 For example, key stakeholders in Dublin are now widely understood to have a perspective on the state’s current 
decentralisation policy that is markedly different to the rest of the country. Furthermore the state’s decision not to 
categorise Dublin as a ‘gateway’ in the National Spatial Strategy (2002) raised questions in the city as to the growing 
awareness of the role Dublin plays as the engine of Irish recent economic growth. 
3 A 1963 Local Government (Planning and Development) Act created a standardised layout of housing estates in terms 
of density, public open space, road widths and services. 
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Reflecting the dismal national economic context, housing was increasingly focused on small infill 
schemes in inner suburban locations and in the improved economic circumstances of the late 1990’s 
to inner city regeneration and gentrification and suburban regeneration including the Ballymun 
Regeneration project of demolition and replacement of over 2000 social housing units, the largest 
regeneration project in Europe.  
 
What ever the reason (lack of expertise, political corruption4 and inadequate governance and 
planning structures all contributed) the impact of this relatively recent failure to effectively plan and 
implement Dublin’s urban development has contributed directly to the metropolitan spatial socio-
economic inequalities in Dublin today. In particular the Dublin transport infrastructure was 
negligible. Without an accessible local employment infrastructure or adequate access to more 
distant employment, the large local authority schemes became “isolated enclaves of deprivation and 
social exclusion” (Bartley and Shine 2002). As Redmond et al (2008: 28) describe ‘social 
polarisation became highly interconnected with spatial segregation’ with inner city and large 
suburban local authority housing estates housing an urban poor characterised by high levels of 
unemployment, early school leaving and educational disadvantage, inadequate housing, low quality 
environment health inequality and drug alcohol addiction and finally low levels bridging and 
linking social capital.  
  
When deprivation indicators are employed, it can be seen that the spatial pattern of deprivation is 
characterised by a high level of deprivation concentrated in a relatively narrow swathe of wards 
running west from Neilstown through Ballyfermot, Crumlin, the Inner City and to the Dublin 
Docks. West Tallaght is a significant outcropping of deprivation in the south west. In North Dublin, 
areas  characterised by deprivation include North Blanchardstown, South and West Finglas, 
Ballymun and the Darndale/Priorswood area (RAPID Programme Areas). There is relatively little 
correlation between increased housing densities and poverty and deprivation. Irish metropolitan 
areas tend to be characterised by a lower density suburban environment (usually 20 dwellings to 
one hectare) in comparison with most of our EU partners. Our tradition of land use closely follows 
British, North American and Australian patterns instead of the compact nature typified by most 
European city forms (the contiguous built-up area of Dublin occupies roughly twice the area of 
Cologne, Copenhagen or Prague). Land use patterns in the peripheral areas of Dublin tend to be 
characterised by a strong degree of land use segregation, employment and retail functions tend to be 
 
4 Issues associated with the failure to develop this neighbourhood infrastructure in one particular area is presently the 
subject of a tribunal of enquiry into corruption in local authority planning – the Flood Tribunal. 
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located at significant distances from residential areas, resulting in commuting, traffic congestion 
and social and economic exclusion for a large number of people in local authority and private 
housing estates. In addition, the scope for land use intensification in suburban areas remains limited 
due to the inflexible pattern of road layout. This acts as “a powerful constraint on the potential for 
redevelopment” (Williams et al 2001). Consequently, there has been a constant if unspoken drive to 
move further and further out to green-field development sites. Recent outward growth of the city 
has surpassed the rate attained in the 1970s. While there is a constraint due to the lack of serviced 
land, development continued unabated with development of commuting towns and villages at 
distances of up to 80k from Dublin. This is widely acknowledged as unsustainable and may lead a 
new but very different type of marginalised periphery. This ever-increasing sprawl is in direct 
contravention of the state’s efforts to manage this growth and runs counter to Strategic Planning 
Guidelines for the Greater Dublin Area (introduced in April 1999 and in law since 1st January 
2001). This failure to plan and execute transport and effective city management is an important 
context for what can be delivered under RAPID.  
 
Map of Dublin City 13 administrative areas and 9 RAPID areas (designated with arrows)  
 
  
 
As can be seen spatial concentrations of deprivation exist primarily in the inner city and outer 
suburbs bounded by the M50 motorway which runs in a C shaped ring around the north-eastern, 
northern, western and southern sides of Dublin. Dublin City area accounts for 11.9% of the 
population but above average levels of socio economic disadvantage, nationally however it 
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disproportionately accounts for over a quarter of special designated disadvantaged area based 
partnerships and also accounts for a third of urban RAPID projects. Using the SAHRU (Kelly and 
Teljeur 2004) deprivation index which measures deprivation using census data Dublin City 
accounts for 22% of the most deprived District electoral divisions in the country (76 out of 343) and 
includes the ten most deprived wards in the country (all of which are unsurprisingly in the city’s 
RAPID areas). These areas are characterised by unemployment and low educational attainment (up 
to 50% leaving school at 16 or earlier), low social class, an absence of car or home ownership, over 
crowding and very high social welfare dependency (over 50% dependent with isolated areas and 
particular communities of interest like the Traveller community experiencing 100% welfare 
dependency).  
 
While Dublin City 2006 census socioeconomic indicators have not yet been analysed there are 
initial signs of some improvement (Haase 2008). Distribution of growing affluence associated with 
Celtic Tiger Ireland highlights the overriding importance of Ireland’s urban centres, affluent areas 
are distributed in concentric rings around the main population centres in urban commuter belts of 
large-scale private housing development in the outer urban periphery with high concentrations of 
relatively affluent young couples. The relative position of local areas over the past fifteen years is 
largely unchanged with the worst affected areas in 1991 in the same position in 2006, except 
Dublin’s Inner City which has experienced significant gentrification. There is a noticeable 
narrowing of the distribution of scores due to the differential impact of the economic boom on areas 
with particularly high rates of emigration, overcrowding and unemployment however some of the 
most disadvantaged urban areas, particularly in Limerick, Cork and Waterford, have failed to 
participate in this generalised improvement in living standards, and have, as a consequence, fallen 
even further behind the more affluent areas of Ireland. Whether these changes are a result of 
government policy or more macro economic growth requires more in-depth evaluation. 
 
RAPID 
The RAPID Programme was launched in February 2001 in order to direct State assistance towards 
improving quality of life and access to opportunities for communities in 25 (now 27) designated 
disadvantaged urban areas throughout Ireland. A year later, the second strand of the programme 
extended its coverage to a further 20 provincial towns. RAPID’s guiding principles reflect several 
governance concepts including community participation and local ownership but also include 
principles that reflect the language of new managerialism or new public management;  promotion of 
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strategic planning; co-ordination of provision of public services; flexibility; targeting of ‘additional’ 
services, investment and facilities. To implement RAPID a multi-tiered implementation structure 
was established, consisting of a National Monitoring Committee, County/City Social Inclusion 
Monitoring Groups (SIMs) and local Area Implementation Teams (AITs) supported by a full time 
RAPID Co-ordinator (RCO). At the outset of the programme, each RAPID area developed an Area 
Plan, a strategic document to outline the overall aims and objectives of the programme in the area, 
and a series of actions to be undertaken based on identified local needs. The central ethos of the 
programme was to provide priority and frontloaded access for RAPID areas to existing statutory 
funds and no overall defined RAPID budget was put in place. The legacy of this that it has been 
difficult to precisely measure the added value of RAPID5. 
 
In the first national evaluation of the RAPID Programme the Fitzpatrick Review (2006) concluded 
that while all national departments and agencies appeared committed to RAPID6 there were 
different approaches to implementation with substantial differences across government 
departments. While acknowledging the pro-activity of the Department of Community, Rural and 
Gaeltacht Affairs, the review highlighted the underdeveloped role of the Department of Education 
and Science (DES), the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment (DETE), and FÁS 
(employment services and labour market programmes) in the planning of programme activity at 
local level and the consequences for disadvantaged areas of investment in education, training and 
employment. A major national reorganisation of the health administration and the establishment of 
a new national agency, the Health Service Executive, also impeded effective partnership work at 
national and local level. Hence we see the difficulty of multilevel governance when the vertical and 
horizontal governance links are so clearly inconsistent and the quality of national government 
department’s participation so variable.  
 
Despite some initial scepticism, the review found RAPID associated with increased levels of, and 
effective use of, public sector investment facilitating important local projects. Clear prioritisation of 
 
5 RAPID’s stated objective was to focus the attention of state agencies and their existing budgets (there was no new 
funding available for projects but £5million was put in place to support the programme) on the 25 most deprived urban 
neighbourhoods.  
6 A very detailed survey of AITs was undertaken as part of the evaluation process, with responses received from over 
two-thirds of the 45 RAPID areas. Some of the key findings included local authority, HSE, FÁS, An Garda Síochána, 
local community organisations and the local community were represented on all of the AITs, with the VEC, Elected 
Members and Department of Social and Family Affairs (DSFA) involved in the majority of cases. In some areas the 
Local Drugs Task Force, Probation and Welfare Service, Youth Services Board and local schools also participated on 
AITs.  
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RAPID areas in the allocation of funding by a number of departments, effective working 
partnerships and the use of ‘leverage’ schemes in the areas of health, estate management and 
playground improvements were seen as pivotal in providing funding that could be linked directly to 
the programme. The Fitzpatrick Review also identifies outstanding issues and gaps, including 
funding, education, employment and training, and family support interventions. While capacity of 
the community to engage in the development and progression of local projects appeared to have 
grown significantly focused work was required to engage the most marginalised groups including 
older people, new communities of non-Irish nationals and youths. While the Fitzpatrick Review 
found a number of ‘impressive’ positive outcomes associated with RAPID7 they identified a small 
number of areas where RAPID had a limited impact on the effective prioritisation of resources and 
where there has been limited formation of good working partnerships or project momentum, a 
general weakness in strategic planning, ad hoc and reactive approach to bringing forward projects, 
little holistic sense of area needs, lack of success in empowering the participation of the relevant 
community and lack of commitment of some key stakeholders involved in the implementation 
process.  
 
While not all of the above problems relate only to Dublin City RAPID and while not all Dublin City 
RAPID Programmes have all those problems it is fair to say that the Fitzpatrick Review and other 
more informal reflections confirm that the experience of RAPID in Dublin city has been 
qualitatively different to the rest of the country. The question, from a metropolitan governance 
perspective, is why the Dublin RAPID experience has been markedly different from the rest of the 
country. Is it some thing about Dublin City Rapid projects that makes them less likely to succeed? 
Or is it something about RAPID governance processes that makes RAPID less likely to succeed in 
Dublin, a metropolitan area? Is there an argument for different governance structures to tackle 
spatial inequality in metropolitan areas?  
     Dublin RAPID  
 
When an interim Fitzpatrick Review’s highlighted particular challenges for the Dublin City RAPID 
Programme, Dublin City Council and ADM (now Pobal) initiated a Strategic Review of the RAPID 
Programme in Dublin City. The lessons from this review, called hereafter the Dolphin Review, 
 
7 Fitzpatrick highlights 97% of AITs believed actual activity reflected that planned to a significant or to some extent. 
AIT structures demonstrated in most areas an ability to act as a conduit for funding, a coordination mechanism for 
funding and an important local information source. Effective work is associated with ongoing commitment to strategic 
planning, monitoring and evaluation. The most prominent types of projects progressed in RAPID areas focused on the 
physical environment, recreational facilities and community development, accounting for over 60% of all projects 
progressed. 
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were subsequently considered by the Social Inclusion Measures group (a subcommittee of the 
Dublin City Development Board)8 and were the subject of a February 2008 SIM consultation 
meeting with RAPID stakeholders. The discussion below evaluating the issues for RAPID in 
Dublin City combines material from the Dolphin Review, the February 2008 Dublin City RAPID 
consultation and supplementary follow up interviews with key stakeholders.  
 
The Dolphin Review found a number of positive aspects of Dublin City’s RAPID experience, the 
programme has for instance, increased the level of networking and co-ordination at local level 
between and within the local community, staff in statutory agencies and elected representatives, 
“only for RAPID, we wouldn’t know people in the agencies” (RAPID Review 08). RAPID has also 
made a significant contribution in some areas to building capacity at individual and community 
level, provided substantial training and development for community representatives in some AITs 
and fast-tracked the development of particular flat complexes, “at the very least, it gives us a voice 
that we wouldn’t have otherwise” (RAPID Review 08). Dublin City RAPID also influenced how 
spending programmes have been developed in RAPID areas. Without this capacity some 
community representatives felt more direct RAPID resources available initially ‘would all have 
gone to the statutory agencies.’ RAPID is acknowledged as a significant catalyst for change in 
some areas/agencies, has increased the awareness of some statutory agencies of the need for more 
inclusive dialogue with the community and provided models of interagency projects. It has been 
particularly successful in achieving significant small-scale objectives, for example the local 
enhancement of flat complexes, introducing concept of schools as lifelong learning centres, the 
development of local health and sports centres. The review’s examination of on the programme’s 
weaknesses and barriers to progress varied depending on the local area and stakeholder group so it 
is important to note that following summary of key concerns and barriers does not apply to all 
areas.  
 
Resources  
From inception of RAPID, awareness of needs and, possibly more important, the funding 
expectations of community groups in Dublin City exceeded those in smaller towns and cities. The 
Fitzpatrick Review (2006) observes that in urban areas and particularly Dublin City very ambitious 
plans were submitted by AITs in the expectation of significant additional funding which did not 
 
8 The Dublin City Development Board was established on a non-statutory basis in 2000. It was given a statutory basis 
by the Local Government Act, 2001. Development Boards (34 linked to the 29 counties and 5 city councils) provide a 
forum for interaction among public agencies, quasi-public agencies like area partnerships, elected representatives 
(councillors) and nominees for the local community and voluntary sectors. 
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then materialise. The Fitzpatrick Review notes that there was a strong consensus that a major 
barrier to progress in the programme to date has been this lack of tangible, accessible resources. 
The Dolphin Review similarly notes that while RAPID started with “great fanfare” and excitement, 
it created the expectation of significant resources and then failed to deliver on these in terms of 
additional funding. The absence of specific additional resources meant no financial ‘carrot’ for the 
main statutory stakeholders in Dublin City to take the RAPID Programme seriously. While RAPID 
has been successful enabling directly or indirectly appropriately sized and often small additional 
projects to small towns or areas in large towns or smaller cities, the scale and cope of need in 
Dublin City simply cannot be facilitated by the concept of RAPID or by treating Dublin’s RAPID 
areas as having the same need as other RAPID areas (Dublin RAPID stakeholders, for example, 
point out the frustration of seeing rural groups hand back money while they had insufficient funds). 
'disproportionate historical resource allocation' - perhaps highlight the fact that because of the lack 
of discretion regarding what funding can be spent on by Pobal - this results in oversupply of 
facilities for which funding can be sought and lack of other facilities because there is no funding 
stream agreed by central government i.e. community just applies for funding to get it because it's 
available and also that often the amount of funding is outweighed by the level of monitoring and 
reporting back on the funding expenditure. 
 
Statutory Agencies Involvement  
Some of the problems in Dublin RAPID are those experienced word wide and well documented in 
literature examining local development and partnership working processes. This literature 
emphasises, the need for the right people with appropriate decision making power to be consistently 
at the table with well informed statutory objectives about what they hope to achieve. Dolphin found, 
across the stakeholder groups, a low level of ownership and understanding of the programme and an 
absence of clear strategic direction and leadership overall for RAPID in Dublin City. Specifically 
there has been a lack of clarity from the outset of the programme as to the management culture in 
statutory agencies required to support the implementation of RAPID. There is a particularly low 
level of buy-in to the programme from many of the statutory agencies, and strong negativity from 
some representatives who perceive RAPID as an unnecessary layer that adds little value as projects 
‘would be happening anyway.’ It was evident from the consultation meetings that only a minority 
of statutory representatives have grasped how a culture of empowerment, partnership and 
integration can benefit them in their work. There may be a specific Dublin experience of this. 
Statutory agencies in smaller towns have more immediate loyalty and identity with the local area, 
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the statutory actor in Dublin City will often not live in the city and may have no local connection 
with the actual RAPID area and no personal relationship with community leaders.  
 
It is clear that RAPID generally, and Dublin RAPID in particular, is suffering at a local level from 
the geo political fragmentation, a dysfunctional overly centralised national policy process and that 
there is a functional problem with how national planning is integrated with local delivery. There are 
clear structural issues that need to be resolved if agencies are enabled to play an effective role, the 
national structures of Department of Education and Science for example do not facilitate local 
involvement. The failure to achieve a coherent reorganisation of the Health Services Executive 
means local confusion about roles, boundaries and budgets. Most crucial of all there is a complex 
pattern of administrative and governance jurisdictions within Dublin City which is highly 
fragmented. None of the six main statutory agencies, comprising local government, health, policing, 
education, labour market and social welfare have common administrative boundaries and none are 
consistent with local development or social inclusion territorial designations. Perhaps you could 
include a point in relation to the difficulty this poses in collating information as a means of 
assessing future need, future planning, benchmarking, target setting, and quantifying progress and 
that this also makes it difficult to provide evidence based argument to amend any government 
procedures/practices. Ireland remains highly centralised with little devolution of core service 
functions to local government and no local taxation or revenue capacity for local administration (Ó 
Broin and Waters 2007). It is clear that horizontal and vertical governance relationships have 
hampered both policy and practice in relation to spatial inequality.  
 
Overlap between RAPID and existing Area Based Partnerships  
In order to draw in the existing budgets of state agencies, the Area Implementation Team 
(management committee, hereafter AIT) of each RAPID area had to draft a strategic plan and needs 
analysis. This was announced some months after the well established area partnerships9 had 
completed the same process for the same areas. Despite the obvious duplication of effort, the 
statutory members of the partnerships were obliged to join the AIT and two community members 
were nominated by each partnership (in fact the boards of the partnerships were reproduced except 
for the social partners). It was unclear whether community members of the AIT should be 
nominated by the partnership or whether a new round of consultation should take place as to how to 
select the community members. In Dublin a number of area partnerships had to take over the 
 
9 Area-based local development partnerships which had been established in 1991 and covered the same but wider 
geographical areas as the RAPID. 
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running of the RAPID Programme as it ran into problems of consultation fatigue on the part of the 
community and the lack of experience of many of the recently appointed RAPID Co-ordinators. In 
five of the original RAPID areas in Dublin the Manager/Chief Executive of the partnership became 
the chairperson of the AIT. In addition statutory agencies are pressurised trying to service up to five 
‘competing’ local social inclusion structures; local area based partnerships, local drugs task forces, 
RAPID AITs, Area Policing Committees, Homeless Forums  and Community Development 
Programmes.  
 
 
Local community  
Irish urban areas characterised by high levels of socio economic and education are also 
characterised by lower levels of bridging and linking social capital, this suggests more intensive 
community development processed may be needed to enable community participation in 
disadvantaged urban areas. Many Dublin based community and local development representatives 
are vocal about what they perceive as the failure of RAPID to deliver on the original expectation of 
significant resources and by the ongoing lack of statutory buy-in. While resources were now 
increasing, there were several concerns in relation to this. The resources coming on stream were 
very small ‘drip-feeding crumbs’, the huge amount of paperwork associated with it which is a 
source of frustration, community representatives felt they were asked to ‘play god’ in relation to 
endorsing applications for this funding and received little training for this level of decision-making 
and responsibility. In addition, given Dublin’s larger population and pockets of significant 
disadvantage there are very different levels of capacity among community groups themselves and 
tension and mistrust between those who are strong, well established and politically skilled and those 
groups who are newer and more vulnerable. In addition, there is no process of periodic reviews to 
update whether RAPID areas remain appropriate or whether they should be amended.  
 
The experience of RAPID has also reinforced a culture of blame in some communities and a ‘them 
and us’ mentality between community groups and statutory agencies. This tension is also borne out 
at national level where Dublin City’s RAPID representatives are perceived as ‘moaning’. It is 
possible that patterns of ineffective communication have been embedded over the eight years and, 
at this stage, neither side is effectively listening to each other. In terms of political participation and 
political behaviour there are marked spatial patterns in both voter turn out (lower in spatially 
deprived areas) and voting choices (less median voter patterns and more protest voting of non 
establishment parties, especially Sinn Féin, in spatially deprived areas). While the weak system of 
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local government means there is little flexibility to administer local resources other than on a 
prorate population basis, an examination of the GIS mapping survey of the city clearly shows 
disproportionate historical resource allocation processes and perceptions of variable standards in 
service delivery across the city. 
   
RAPID Co-ordinating Officers (RCOs)  
In the absence of clear guidelines and strategic leadership, RCOs have a sense of being left to carry 
the burden of motivating people at a local level. Among RCOs there is a wide diversity of 
experience and skills, resulting in significantly different approaches to their role and the capacity 
they bring to their work. The RCOs have had to negotiate their reporting relationships with DCDB 
Management, AITs and DCC Area Management – three distinct players. Hence there is no clear 
comprehensive line management structure for the RCOs that would ensure a consistent integrated 
approach to their work. In addition there is significant DCC staff turn over where RCO’s transfer to 
other posts and hence little DCC staff continuity in RAPID areas. The increasing managerialist 
culture within the wider public service has increased administrative workloads, particularly 
complying with Pobal’s onerous bureaucratic processes takes up an increasingly inappropriate 
amount of time for RCOs and, consequently, RCOs feel that their talents, skills and time were being 
under-utilised.  
 
Lack of leadership in a weak system of local administration   
The aforementioned lack of strategic input to RAPID from the political and managerial leadership 
of Dublin City Council requires explanation. It is questionable whether the operational structures 
for leadership on social inclusion in Dublin City can be effective given the size and scale of the 
challenge of RAPID programme in Dublin City10. More significant however is the weak system of 
local government in Ireland, an outcome associate with Ireland’s colonial past. The legacy is a  
system more akin to local administration for a highly centralised national government and a system 
with ‘a relatively narrow remit’ devoid of influence in key areas for social inclusion; health, 
 
10 While the larger problems addressed here can only be addressed through local government reform and addressing 
Dublin City’s governance needs there are some more immediate areas where the city could act. Hence while DCC has 
contributed substantial resources to the programme and is a consistent and active participant in the process it is also 
perceived as slow in giving RAPID the focused attention, direction and support needed to have it succeed and develop 
to its full potential. Various consultations and evaluations recognise that DCC need to ensure required operational 
planning and performance management systems are put in place across the programme are essential to its successful 
delivery and in particular at city level reduce number of AIT meetings to manageable level. DCC could also try to 
overlap RAPID and city budgetary planning processes by formally linking the Area Budget and annual plans to the 
RAPID. DCC could also make more active use of the local community structures or forums for consultation and more 
consistent communication with community representatives.  
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education, social welfare labour market and policing (Callanan and Keogan 2003:9). A significant 
challenge for all social inclusion measures is that they rely for leadership on monitoring and support 
structures that themselves have only evolved in the time frame of RAPID. National evaluations 
show that the leadership structures in Irish local government (the Strategic Policy Committees, and 
their co-ordinating mechanism the Corporate Policy Group [attended by SPG Chairs, the City 
Mayor and City Manager and relevant senior management staff]) were slow to evolve or reach full 
functional effectiveness. In Dublin City, the evolution of these structures had proved particularly 
problematic with new structures competing in leadership roles with a system that still recognises 
political party group leaders as the formal political leadership of the city11. This leaves those in 
formal policy leadership positions less powerful than envisaged and less able to impact on policy.  
 
Furthermore the sheer size and scale of governance issues in Dublin City, not only the largest 
council in Ireland but also the council with the most complex policy agenda, makes it very difficult 
to provide a more micro level leadership for RAPID. Many question the capacity of 52 part time 
councillors to provide adequate leadership in managing the governance of these complex urban 
policies and submissions to a Green Paper on Local Government (2008) have argued urban 
governance needs must be a priority for local government reform (Lacey 2008)12. The relatively 
low attendance, of the larger parties (Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael) in city and local level social 
inclusion related policy committees highlights the lack of political commitment of the two larger 
parties to social inclusion but also means that those committed to social inclusion are overburdened 
with social inclusion related work (that bears little electoral rewards).  
 
Role of the Social Inclusion Measures Group  
The national implementation structures for RAPID stressed the importance of city or county level 
monitoring and in theory gave this role to the Social Inclusion Measures group (SIM)13. Given the 
previous discussion it should be of little surprise that SIM in particular was slow to develop in 
Dublin City. Some of SIM’s development problems arise from the legacy of a particular period of 
institutional building by the local authority and other local actors in the CDB where a strategic 
decision was taken to develop social inclusion task forces in each of the five areas of the city. This 
 
11 While theoretically it might have been assumed that political party group’s leaders might have assumed policy 
leadership positions as chairs of the city’s six strategic policy committees the work load involved in carrying all roles 
simultaneously worked against this outcome. 
12 Since 2004 over a third of Dublin City Councillors have resigned. This is unprecedented and unique among Irish 
local authorities and generally understood to be a result of failure to reform metropolitan governance processes to meet 
the challenge of governing a complex urban city like 21st Century Dublin.    
13 SIM is a sub-committee of the City Development Board, a partnership structure composed of statutory agencies, 
community representatives and the six political chairs of the council’s strategic management committees. 
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strategic direction was controversial and perceived by many local social actors to be in competition 
with existing social inclusion structures especially the area partnerships in the city. There were 
various impacts from this direction, the fall out severed effective communication between key 
stakeholders, it distracted CDB staff and members from the task of supporting, politically and 
practically, the Dublin City RAPID14.  
 
While political and management leadership of SIM is now affirmed there are still obstacles to 
SIM’s monitoring role in Dublin City15. Taking the endorsement process as an example, SIM are 
required by Pobal to endorse the annual and strategic plans of all social inclusion agencies in the 
city. Theoretically it is assumed that this endorsement process provides an opportunity to achieve 
integration and avoid overlap and duplication in the various plans. In smaller councils with less 
spatial concentration of socioeconomic inequality this can work well. SIM might, for example, 
achieve some added value for a review of and endorsement of one area partnership Plan, Three 
Community Development Project (CDP) plans and two RAPID plans. In Dublin City however the 
scale of the problem means reviewing 48 CCP plans, 9 RAPID plans and 9 area partnership plans. 
This cannot be achieved in a meaningful way and no one could blame the agencies being endorsed 
for perceiving the Dublin City endorsement exercise as a fruitless exercise in power by SIM. For 
this reason SIM has adopted ‘a light touch’ approach to endorsement which while effectively 
managing political tensions also realises little integration or added value.  
 
Square pegs into round holes.  
 
This paper has identified several structural issues relating to the size and density of Dublin City and 
the need for appropriately designed metropolitan governance structures consistent with Dublin’s 
scale and size. Specifically the fact that there are nine RAPID areas in Dublin City means it is 
difficult to ensure active participation on all of these by all statutory agencies due to the number of 
meetings involved. The number of social inclusion projects, while perhaps warranted, is also 
impacted by the obvious boundary inconsistencies in the operational structures of the different 
statutory agencies. There are practical implications arising from this, for example the capacity of 
statutory agencies to attend meetings in different areas. The Dublin City RAPID areas geographical 
 
14 Dolphin (2005) observed no evidence of SIM working effectively in the provision of strategic support or monitoring 
to RAPID., there is no clear strategic direction about the level of support to be given at City level, no positive written 
policy statement of commitment to continuation of the programme and a clear understanding of where long-term 
structural relationship of RAPID to SIM.  
15  Various leaders have accepted some level of responsibility for the lack of clear direction for Dublin City RAPID 
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boundaries are inconsistent with local community or statutory priorities. This overlap of 
committees’ membership and the statutory agency boundary confusion is experienced more 
intensely in Dublin City than anywhere else in the country. Membership of AITs often comprises 
staff or members of other social inclusion agencies in the same area, for example a community 
development project, a drugs task force, an area partnership or a local area policing committee. It is 
not unrealistic that the same people could meet at different meetings but talking about similar 
themes three times in one day- as one participant observed ‘we are literally tripping over ourselves’ 
(Review 2008). City scale and density requires also require different funding structures and Dublin 
City Council’s funding mechanisms cannot use leverage in the same way as smaller areas where, 
for example a playground budget of €66,000 will have a significant local impact. The fact that 
RAPID is perceived more favourably in rural areas may be because RAPID as it is presently 
designed and executed simply works better for smaller geographical areas. A different structure is 
required to access the scale of funds and deliver projects capable of making a difference to Dublin 
City. 
 
The issue of scale means Dublin needs different governance and support structures for enabling 
national social inclusion initiatives to be successfully implemented in Dublin City. While a national 
cohesion process which began in 2004 achieved some consistency nationwide the issues of cross 
participation, boundary confusion, time and scale are still intense in Dublin City. There have been 
some suggestions of a central social inclusion co-ordinating body in each local administrative area 
of the city but little progress has been made towards addressing these problems. The cohesion 
process remains an ongoing opportunity or context to reform metropolitan governance but city level 
and national leadership is required to make further progress.  
 
National and city level relationships  
Progressing appropriate urban governance structures for Dublin requires integrated thinking 
between national departmental and statutory agencies, political leadership and local government 
leadership. The integrated leadership between DCC and Pobal required to develop a shared vision 
and build ownership of the RAPID Programme at a city level has not so far been sufficient. There 
has been a failure of the political leadership of the city to represent or articulate a vision for Dublin 
RAPID or socio economic spatial disadvantage more generally. RAPID Co-ordinating Officers 
have tried but to date also failed to articulate this need for Dublin City (and have in the process 
developed conflictual relations between Dublin City RAPID and the national level support 
structures (Pobal). It is acknowledged that a fresh approach is needed by all sides to break out of the 
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current impasse and to once again keep the focus on the ‘big picture’ and a solution of sufficient 
scale to match the scale of the problem.  
 
However part of the evolving story about the relationship between Dublin City RAPID and the 
national supporting structures (Pobal) has been the significant structural, political and ideological 
change at national level, when in 2002, a new department was created, the Department of 
Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs, to become the principal interlocutor with the social 
inclusion sector. At the inception of RAPID a relatively independent quango, Area Development 
Management, was given initial responsibility for the administration of the RAPID Programme and 
co-ordinating its implementation on behalf of the parent department. In 2002 this agency was 
reorganised and brought under direct ministerial control.16. Harvey (2008) argues these institutional 
shifts represent an abrupt paradigmatic shift to the type of managerialist agenda identified earlier in 
the literature review17.  
 
Harvey (2008) argues that considerable policy stalemate over the last two decades in agreeing the 
policy about the relationship between the state and civil society was in part due to territorial rivalry 
between government departments but also in deeper political or ideological tensions within the state 
experienced as to what should be its relationship with the sector. The change in 2002 saw a 
reconfiguration by the state of that voluntary - statutory relationship into a ‘highly contested 
political space’ where there is a climate of subservience and convergence and an unhealthy situation 
for voluntary and community activity likened by Harvey (2008) to an “asphyxiating circle” 
Certainly Pobal is perceived by some Dublin RAPID stakeholders as highly restrictive18 and 
controlling and not particularly supportive. This is consistent with both a managerialist and new 
 
16 Area Development Management’s (ADM) parent departments since 1999 are The Department of Arts, Sports and 
Tourism (1999-2002) and The Department of Community, Rural and Gaeltacht Affairs (2002- ).   
17 The policy context within which ADM/Pobal operates is set by the “successive National Social Partnership 
Agreements and the National Development Plan 2000–2006” (ADM 2003, 4). The agreed “Programme for 
Government” following the 2002 General Election forms the most recent policy context for Pobal’s work. In October 
2005 following a private economic consultancy, Indecon review of ADM’s activities recommendations to reduce the 
strategic autonomy of the agency and reconfigure its relationship with the parent department. In November 2005, ADM 
changed its name to ‘Pobal’, the Irish word for community. Its parent department’s name in Irish is “Pobail’, the Irish 
word for communities. 
 
18 The administrative procedures Pobal have engineered for the administration of the 16,500 euro pa community 
support budget (which has five headings and 25 sub headings) shows how Pobal are micromanaging projects are 
requiring significant technical detail which makes coordinators into administrators rather creative facilitators.  
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public management ideological agenda. It is not consistent with a community empowerment 
approach offered in the original conception of RAPID.  
The politics of the state’s relationship with society is an important context for RAPID. RAPID 
exists in the deeper political or ideological context described above. If Harvey (2008) is correct, the 
political agenda behind Pobal’s existence is to mediate poverty and social exclusion in a fashion 
that disempowers community development approaches then the political commitment to RAPID 
and community led approaches to social inclusion is itself under question19. This lack of political 
leadership or even awareness of poverty and lack of understanding of community development led 
approaches to poverty is a crucial issue for the city and at a national level. This ideological tension 
needs to be separated from the more pragmatic question of area boundaries and urban governance 
structures for Dublin City. 
 
Conclusion  
To date Irish approaches to urban governance have been primarily based on social partnership 
processes but, with the growing awareness of ‘process fatigue’ and governance limitations to 
resolving social deficits and spatial inequalities, there is now a national debate about how to reform 
governance processes to achieve greater social innovation and address geographical inequalities 
(NESC 2005). Dublin is not a ‘global city’ but, increasingly dominated by financial and service 
industries, it has all the characteristics of a complex urban society with the extremes of wealth and 
poverty often found in those societies. However we do not see in Dublin what Jessop calls 
‘glurbanisation’, i.e. new forms of governance in the urban and through the urban (Jessop 1997).  
 
The paper’s argument for a more cohesive relationship between local actors in Irish urban 
governance opens up the question of whether this examination of Irish metropolitan governance 
processes has any wider application. Targeted area-based governance initiatives can bring only 
limited results unless they are tied into regional or national governance processes with power to 
shift mainstream funding or to reform national housing, industrial, employment and development 
policies that are continuing (as in Dublin’s case) to cause and reinforce concentrations of 
disadvantage. The paper also highlights the value of governance processes that enable community 
participation but the difficulty in sustaining community participation in the context of ill-fitting and 
badly supported participative structures, and low social capital. It draws attention to the significant 
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cultural shifts required within both community and statutory organisations to make ‘partnership’ 
work. Above all however what the paper demonstrates is that, in the context of ‘glocalisation’, the 
importance of urban governance structures that enable cities find appropriate responses to spatial 
disadvantage cannot be over stated. Irish urban governance is hindered by nationally imposed 
problems of geopolitical fragmentation and the difficulties of working in highly complex patterns of 
local administrative governance processes. Vertical and horizontal arrangements have hampered 
rather than assisted strategies to mitigate spatial social inequalities. Community development 
strategies have failed to address key issues of community capacity and participation. The Irish case 
demonstrates the dangers of fitting square pegs into round holes and the asphyxiating choke this can 
have on urban governance and its capacity to revitalise socio economically disadvantaged areas.  
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